The UN in Cyprus
An Inter-communal Survey

Special Edition
April 2007
In January and February of 2007, a island-wide poll, commissioned by UNFICYP, was conducted with a sample of Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. In addition, a special sample of Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, all resident within the UN buffer zone, was selected for comparison with the general population.

For purposes of this project, UNFICYP retained the services of a Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot expert consultant, Alexandros Lordos and Erol Kaymak respectively, whose task it was to assist with the preparation of the questionnaire and interpretation of the results. In addition, two well-established polling companies, CYMAR Market Research and Prologue Consulting, were selected through a tendering process to carry out the fieldwork.

All three UNFICYP pillars – the UN Police, Civil Affairs, and Military – as well as the office of the Chief of Mission contributed to the survey design. In addition to UNFICYP, other UN agencies currently operating in Cyprus participated in the survey.

Commissioned to evaluate UNFICYP’s effectiveness and ongoing relevance after 43 years on the island, the survey comprised face-to-face, detailed interviews with 1,000 Greek Cypriots and 1,000 Turkish Cypriots in their respective languages.

An additional sample of 350 was selected from among UN buffer zone residents to help determine attitudes to UN activities in that area.

The poll was designed to ascertain how Cypriots view UNFICYP and the UN presence on the island and to determine how familiar they are with the range and purpose of UN-supported activities in Cyprus. The data will be used to help the UN presence better shape and direct such activities to more effectively assist Cypriots in the search for a peaceful resolution of their differences through a return to normal conditions and an agreed comprehensive settlement.

As to the specifics of the UN presence in Cyprus, the survey results show the public to be most aware of UNFICYP, the Demining Project (UNMAC), and the Committee on Missing Persons (CMP).

While majorities in both communities are aware of UNFICYP’s presence and role, Turkish Cypriots are likely to be more familiar with its activities than Greek Cypriots. A majority in both communities view UNFICYP’s presence on the island as a positive. Both view an negative any withdrawal scenario involving UNFICYP’s departure before restoration of normal conditions and a settlement. Each community derives its primary sense of security from its unilateral arrangements for military security, with the UN Peacekeeping Force seen in a secondary role. However, the survey response shows that the UN Peacekeeping Force is the only military force on the island that simultaneously enhances the sense of security of both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.

The survey also shows that most Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots are aware of the UN buffer zone’s basic purpose and of the regulations and limitations regarding its use. Large majorities in both communities believe that the UN should do more to understand Cypriot concerns and would welcome closer contact between the UN and the public. Examples of how this could be done include outreach programmes to villages and towns, in-depth research into Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot concerns, an interactive website promoting inter-communal dialogue or a publication dealing with the peace process translated into Turkish and Greek.

Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots reaffirm confidence in UN presence

Majorities in both communities consider that the United Nations has an important role to play in Cyprus and that its presence on the island is essential, according to the UNFICYP-commissioned survey.

At the same time, a majority of Greek Cypriots believes that the UN is biased in favour of Turkish Cypriots while, conversely, Turkish Cypriots believe it is similarly biased in favour of Greek Cypriots. In both communities, a majority view suggests that the UN needs to make a stronger effort to reach out and understand the concerns of the wider Cypriot public.

Large majorities in both communities are convinced that day-to-day bicultural contact is essential for peace in united Cyprus and there is approval for those who reach out to the other community through such contacts. For the good of all, notwithstanding, only a small percentage of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots view one another in a bicultural context despite evidence that such contacts increase levels of trust towards members of the other community.

Even though both communities generally accept and acknowledge bicultural benefits of inter-communal contact, there is great sensitivity over the extent to which non-Cypriot intermediaries should get involved in facilitating and promoting such activities. While ‘assistance by the UN or others’ is seen as potentially helpful, the overall message from survey respondents is that non-Cypriot intermediaries should maintain a distance by ‘assisting and facilitating’ while avoiding any perception of ‘interfering and meddlin’g’.

Of various possible types of inter-communal contact, the most acceptable to both communities is environmental cooperation by Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and also, joint research projects by Greek and Turkish Cypriot academicians working together.

Both communities view the work of the Committee on Missing Persons (CMP) and the Mine Action Centre (MAC) as making significant contributions to confidence-building measures.

Large majorities – 90% among Greek Cypriots, 75% among Turkish Cypriots – approve the work of the CMP. Among Greek Cypriots, almost everyone (96% of those interviewed) is aware of the CMP’s recent rehabilitation activities, while the awareness level among Turkish Cypriots is 66%. Almost all Greek Cypriots and a strong majority of Turkish Cypriots believe that the examination and identification of remains is an essential process that must be completed before the issue of Missing Persons can be resolved.

On the demining front, both communities acknowledge and appreciate the MAC’s mine clearance activities in the buffer zone and concur that minefields are a leftover from the past that must be removed. Not everyone is aware of the Ottawa Treaty and its significance or the obligation to remove anti-personnel mines but most realize that removal of minefields frees land for farming used by both communities and paves the way for improved levels of trust between the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots.

Research and Prologue Consulting, were selected through a tendering process to carry out the fieldwork.

In addition, two well-established polling companies, CYMAR Market Research and Prologue Consulting, were selected through a tendering process to carry out the fieldwork.

Large majorities in both communities view UNFICYP and the UN presence on the island most familiar with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Development Programme Action for Co-operation and Trust (UND-ACT), and the United Nations Development Programme – Partnership for the Future (UNDP-PPF).

UNFICYP decided to commission this project in order to evaluate the effectiveness and ongoing relevance of its work in Cyprus.

The survey was selected from among UN buffer zone residents to help determine attitudes to UN activities in that area. Of those whose opinions did change, most were especially true among Turkish Cypriots coming south to work, to visit friends, to shop or for recreational purposes.

Most Turkish Cypriots report they still cross the checkpoints with any frequency. Some 50% say that after one or a few initial crossings, they no longer do so. About 10% of Turkish Cypriots report they have never crossed. About 25% have crossed once or occasionally, but not any more. Some 43% of Turkish Cypriots still cross with greater or lesser frequency.

Most Turkish Cypriots report that their opinions of Greek Cypriots remained unchanged as a result of crossing. Of those whose opinions did change, most say they came away with an improved view of Greek Cypriots. This was especially true among Turkish Cypriots coming south to work or visit friends, to shop or for recreational purposes.
Federal solution still best hope for resolving the Cyprus problem

The poll indicates that large majorities in both communities are sceptical about prospects for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem in the foreseeable future. At the same time, only small minorities within each of the two communities seem to believe that “the current status quo is the solution”.

While Greek Cypriots would ideally choose a unitary state solution and Turkish Cypriots ideally a two state solution, a large majority in each community see a federal solution as the second best option and would be prepared to tolerate such a solution as a compromise option. Only 30% of Turkish Cypriots and 35% of Greek Cypriots would adamantly oppose and reject any plan promoting a federal solution to the Cyprus problem. More Turkish Cypriots than Greek Cypriots consider a federal settlement to be “satisfactory”. Greek Cypriots tend to view such an outcome as “tolerable”.

Levels of trust between the two communities remain very low, with majorities in each believing that, even if a comprehensive settlement is achieved, the other community cannot be trusted to stick to the terms agreed. Indeed, when it comes to a preferred settlement, each of the two communities seems to misperceive the other’s intentions. While the majority of Greek Cypriots indicate a willingness to tolerate a federal solution as a “second best” outcome, Turkish Cypriots believe that the majority of Greek Cypriots would reject any federal solution outright. Despite the reality that the majority of Turkish Cypriots would reject a unitary state outright, Greek Cypriots persist in the belief that most Turkish Cypriots would consider a unitary state to be satisfactory.

When it comes to everyday interaction on a personal and neighbourly level, the majority of Greek Cypriots is predisposed towards coexistence with Turkish Cypriots. In contrast, Turkish Cypriots are more divided, albeit reflecting a more moderate range of views than a year ago, in indicating strong approval or disapproval of coexistence with Greek Cypriots.

The process that led to the Annan plan in 2004 is seen as controversial by the Greek Cypriots and acceptable to the Turkish Cypriots. The public in both communities accepts the “Gambari process” even though a majority in each believes the UN’s handling of the process favours the other side. In fact, approval or disapproval of the process is influenced by the same factors in each community – faith in the UN’s impartiality and efficacy and the desire for coexistence with the other community and a settlement of the Cyprus problem. The survey response also shows that those who counted themselves regular readers of the island’s main newspapers tended to take a more disapproving view of the ongoing process.

The charts and texts that follow were selected to present a general overview of the results derived from the interviews conducted this year. Drawn from sections included in the survey, a number of questions were chosen with corresponding data, to illustrate how Cypriots generally view the UN’s work in Cyprus. The data also provides insight into Cypriot opinion on a variety of topics that the mission intends to take into consideration when implementing future programmes. The complete presentation of charts with commentary is available in English, Turkish and Greek on our website for easy downloading. SPSS raw data files can also be obtained here. (www.unficyp.org)

### Q1. “General attitudes toward the UN”

**Sense of Security**

To the question “How secure or insecure do you feel living in Cyprus today”, almost all Turkish Cypriots respond that they feel somewhat or very secure. In contrast, over half of the Greek Cypriots respond that they feel somewhat or very insecure.

The main source of Turkish Cypriot security is the presence of the Turkish Army in Cyprus. In addition, a proportion of Turkish Cypriots derive a sense of security from the fact that bilateral relations between Turkey and Greece have improved in recent years. Greek Cypriots derive a modicum of security from the presence of the Greek Cypriot National Guard and from the fact that Cyprus is now an EU member. However, neither of these two sources of security is perceived to be so credible as to offset the overriding sense of threat that derives from the presence of the Turkish Army. In pondering the probability of different threat scenarios, most Greek Cypriots consider the notion that the Turkish Army may move aggressively against Greek Cypriots in the future. Turkish Cypriots, however, consider it very unlikely that the Turkish Army would take such aggressive action against Greek Cypriots in the future. The sense of security which the two communities derive from the presence of the UN Peacekeeping Force is not as strong as that which each community derives from its own unilateral arrangements for security. That said, the UN Peacekeeping Force is the only military force in Cyprus that simultaneously enhances the sense of security both of Greek Cypriots and of Turkish Cypriots.

**General Perceptions of the UN**

Majorities in both communities consider that the UN has an important role to play in Cyprus and that its presence here is essential. A majority concern that seems to emerge, from both communities, is that the UN needs to make a stronger effort to reach out and understand the concerns of the wider Cypriot public.

As to the specifics of the UN presence in Cyprus, the public is most aware of the Committee for Missing Persons (CMP), UNFICYP and the de-mining project (UNMAC). The public is least aware of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Development Programme – Action for Cooperation and Trust (UNDP-ACT), and the United Nations Development Programme – Partnership for the Future (UNDP-PFF).

### Q2. “How aware are you about each of the UN agencies that operate in Cyprus?”

**Percent of cases**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>Greek Cypriots</th>
<th>Turkish Cypriots</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNDP-ACT</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP-PFF</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Good Offices</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demining</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFICYP</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMP</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Q3. “On the whole, how secure or insecure would you say you feel living in Cyprus today?”**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security Level</th>
<th>Greek Cypriots</th>
<th>Turkish Cypriots</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very insecure</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat insecure</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very secure</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The UN is conducting a very serious effort for the coexistence of communities in Cyprus and re-unite the island. The UN is a powerless and ineffective bystander in Cyprus. The UN is not taking an interest to understand the genuine concerns of the public in Cyprus. The UN has a vital role to play in Cyprus and its absolutely necessary.
UNFICYP
Majorities in both communities are aware of the presence and role of UNFICYP in Cyprus, though Greek Cypriots are more likely to be more aware of UNFICYP than Turkish Cypriots. Furthermore, majorities in both communities say they consider UNFICYP to be a positive presence on the island, and deem as negative any scenario in which UNFICYP withdraws prior to the restoration of normality.

Regarding the UN buffer zone specifically, most Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots are aware of its basic purpose, and also of the regulations and limitations regarding its use. It is apparent that not everyone is aware of the fact that over the years, the buffer zone has become an environmental preserve in which rare animal and plant species flourish. Regarding possibilities for future use of the buffer zone, large majorities of both communities would favour, firstly, the utilisation of the buffer zone for projects that would benefit both communities and increase contact between them, secondly, the designation of certain parts of the buffer zone as environmental parks, and thirdly, more freedom for owners to use their land in the buffer zone as they see fit.

Q4. “The fact that Turkey has troops stationed in Cyprus?”

Q5. “The fact that Greek Cypriot National Guard exists?”

Q6. “The fact that the UN has peacekeepers in Cyprus who patrol the buffer zone?”

Q7. “The fact that Cyprus has joined the European Union?”

Q8. “To what extent do you consider UNFICYP to be a positive or negative presence on the island?”

Q9. “How aware are you of the following facts regarding the buffer zone?”

Q10. “What do you think should be done about the buffer zone?”
Demining

Majorities in both communities are aware that demining activities are ongoing in the buffer zone. Furthermore, majorities of both communities agree that minefields are a remnant of the past, and that they should now be dismantled. Not everyone is aware that the clearing and disposing of anti-personnel mines is an international obligation in accordance with the Ottawa Treaty. In contrast, most are aware that minefields need to be dismantled before farmers can be allowed to use their land in the buffer zone, or before any further crossing points can be opened.

Of the Greek Cypriots who have crossed, a large proportion declared that they now have a worse opinion of Turkish Cypriots as a result. This negative impact was most prevalent among those who crossed once or a few times in the past, in order to visit their old home towns and to conduct a religious pilgrimage. By contrast, the majority of Turkish Cypriots who have crossed report that their opinion of Greek Cypriots has not changed as a result. Of those who report a change in attitude, more say that they now have a better opinion as a result of crossing than those who say their opinion has worsened as a result. Specifically, Turkish Cypriots who have crossed in order to work, to visit friends, to enjoy the nightlife or to go shopping, tend to report that they have a better opinion of Greek Cypriots as a result of crossing.

Since the checkpoints opened in 2003, about 40% of Greek Cypriots declare that they have never crossed, about 50% of Greek Cypriots still cross the checkpoints at a greater or lesser frequency. By comparison, about 30% of Turkish Cypriots have never crossed, about 25% of Turkish Cypriots have crossed once or a few times in the past but don’t cross any more, while about 45% of Turkish Cypriots still cross the checkpoints at a greater or lesser frequency. The conclusion drawn is that almost all Turkish Cypriots who had the right and opportunity to cross actually went ahead and did so.

The vast majority of Greek Cypriots who have crossed chose to restrict themselves to a visit to their pre-1974 home, often combining the trip with a religious pilgrimage to an Orthodox church or monastary. Very few of those who crossed have allowed to taking advantage of recreational and commercial opportunities. By contrast, the majority of Turkish Cypriots who crossed have done so primarily as visitors seeking to take advantage of the new opportunities afforded them by the opening of the checkpoints, with the most commonly cited
reasons for crossing being, firstly, to enjoy the countryside and, secondly, to go shopping. That said, a large number of Turkish Cypriots also crossed to visit their pre-1974 home, to seek official documentation, to work, or to receive medical care.

**Q16. "Regarding the frequency of crossing to the other side, which of the following statements best reflects your own habits?"**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Greek Cypriots</th>
<th>Turkish Cypriots</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1% I go across frequently</td>
<td>39% I go across occasionally whenever a good reason arises</td>
<td>30% I go across frequently</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7% I cross a lot, but I rarely go across nowadays</td>
<td>4% I have only crossed once or a few times in the past, but I don't cross anymore</td>
<td>7% I used to cross a lot, but I rarely go across nowadays</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4% I have only crossed once or a few times in the past, but I don't cross anymore</td>
<td>4% I have never crossed</td>
<td>27% I have only crossed once or a few times in the past, but I don't cross anymore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3% I have never crossed</td>
<td>3% I have never crossed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Q17. "Reasons for crossing"**

- To discuss an issue related to the Cyprus problem in a political or community context
- To see an airport or sea port
- To enjoy the nightlife
- To work or conduct business
- To receive medical attention
- To visit friends
- To conduct official business
- To visit or see an old home or town
- To enjoy beaches and restaurants
- To do my shopping
- To enjoy the countryside

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Turkish Cypriots</th>
<th>Greek Cypriots</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>58% To enjoy the countryside</td>
<td>51% To enjoy the countryside</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12% To do my shopping</td>
<td>14% To do my shopping</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11% To see old homes or town</td>
<td>7% To see old homes or town</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6% To conduct official business</td>
<td>5% To conduct official business</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5% To visit friends</td>
<td>3% To visit friends</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3% To receive medical attention</td>
<td>2% To receive medical attention</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3% To work or conduct business</td>
<td>3% To work or conduct business</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2% To discuss an issue related to the Cyprus problem in a political or community context</td>
<td>3% To discuss an issue related to the Cyprus problem in a political or community context</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Q18. "As a result of crossing the checkpoints, would you say that your opinion of people from the other side has changed?"**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opinion</th>
<th>Greek Cypriots</th>
<th>Turkish Cypriots</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22% I now have a worse opinion</td>
<td>22% I now have a worse opinion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23% I now have a somewhat worse opinion</td>
<td>49% I now have a much worse opinion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40% My opinion hasn't changed</td>
<td>11% My opinion hasn't changed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2% I now have a somewhat better opinion</td>
<td>3% I now have a somewhat better opinion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9% I now have a much better opinion</td>
<td>3% I now have a much better opinion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63% My opinion has changed</td>
<td>22% I now have a worse opinion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22% I now have a somewhat worse opinion</td>
<td>3% I now have a somewhat better opinion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2% I now have a much worse opinion</td>
<td>3% I now have a much better opinion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Inter-communal Contact**

Of the various possible types of inter-communal contact, the most acceptable to both communities is environmental cooperation by Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot NGOs, and also cooperation involving Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot academics working together on common research projects. Even though both communities generally accept and acknowledge the merits and benefits of bicommunal contact, there is great sensitivity over the extent to which non-Cypriot intermediaries should get involved in facilitating and promoting such activities. While "assistance by the UN or others" is seen as potentially helpful, the overall message is that non-Cypriot intermediaries should maintain a delicate balance by "assisting and facilitating" while avoiding any perception of "interfering and meddling". Large majorities in both communities believe that inter-communal contact today is essential to pave the way for a united Cyprus tomorrow. Similarly, a majority in both communities rejects the notion that "only people who are confused about their national identities take part in inter-communal activities".

Despite majority goodwill in both communities to engage in inter-communal contact, only a small percentage of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots has actually come in contact with members of the other community. In those cases where there has been contact with people of the other community, the result on the whole has been an increase in the level of trust towards members of the other community.
Prospects for a Settlement

Large majorities from both communities are currently sceptical about the prospect of a comprehensive settlement in the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, only small minorities from the two communities seem to believe that the current status quo is the solution.

As for the type of solution preferred, the Greek Cypriots would ideally choose a unitary state solution and the Turkish Cypriots would ideally choose a two state solution. However, neither of these frameworks would be acceptable simultaneously to the other community as well – Greek Cypriots strongly reject the notion of a two state solution, while Turkish Cypriots strongly reject the notion of a unitary state solution. A federal solution is seen as second best by both communities – second best to a unitary state for Greek Cypriots, and second best to a two state solution for Turkish Cypriots. In this spirit, and seen as a compromise option, large majorities of both communities would at least be willing to tolerate a federal solution. Only 28% of Turkish Cypriots and 35% of Greek Cypriots would under any circumstances and regardless of the specific plan, reject a federal solution to the Cyprus problem.

More Turkish Cypriots than Greek Cypriots consider a federal settlement of the Cyprus problem to be “satisfactory”. Greek Cypriots, in contrast, tend to view a federal settlement as merely “tolerable”. However, on a level of personal relations, this picture is reversed. More Greek Cypriots than Turkish Cypriots are likely to report “that they have much in common with members of the other community”, and “they would be willing to accept everyday and neighbourly coexistence of the two communities.”
Each of the two communities seems to misperceive the intentions of the other with regard to the type of settlement preferred. In the Greek Cypriot case, while the reality is that the majority of Greek Cypriots would be willing to tolerate a federal solution as a “second best” alternative, the Turkish Cypriots believe that the majority of Greek Cypriots would reject any federal solution outright. In the Turkish Cypriot case, while the reality is that the majority of Turkish Cypriots would reject a unitary state solution outright, Greek Cypriots believe that the majority of Turkish Cypriots would in fact consider a unitary state solution to be satisfactory. As in previous years, the level of trust between the two communities remains very low – majorities of both communities believe that, even if a Comprehensive Settlement is achieved, the other community cannot be trusted to be loyal to what has been agreed.

The Role of the UN

The process that led up to the Annan plan in 2004 is seen as controversial by the Greek Cypriots and acceptable by the Turkish Cypriots. In contrast, the “Gambari Process” that is currently underway is seen as simultaneously acceptable both by the Greek Cypriot public and by the Turkish Cypriot public. In relation to the current “Gambari Process”, a majority of Greek Cypriots believes that the UN is biased in favour of Turkish Cypriots, while a majority of Turkish Cypriots believes that the UN is biased in favour of Greek Cypriots.

Similar factors influence the level of approval or disapproval of the current UN process, both among Greek Cypriots and among Turkish Cypriots. Faith in the UN’s impartiality and efficacy translates into increased support for the process, while the desire for coexistence with the other community and a settlement of the Cyprus problem also leads people to view the process favourably.

Large majorities of both communities would welcome initiatives that would bring the peace process in closer contact with the public in Cyprus – such as an outreach programme to towns and villages, or in-depth research into Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot concerns, or an interactive website through which the people of Cyprus would be enabled to air their concerns and submit proposals, or a magazine – translated into Turkish and Greek - which would provide information related to the peace process.

Q26. Bizonal, bicommunal federation

Q27. Unitary state

Q28. “I would not mind having Turkish / Greek Cypriot neighbours.”

Q29. “The Turkish Cypriots cannot be trusted to adhere to an agreement we might make with them”

Q30. “The Greek Cypriots cannot be trusted to adhere to an agreement we might make with them”

Poll Identity

General population sample: 1,000 Turkish Cypriots and 1,000 Greek Cypriots

Booster sample: 100 Turkish Cypriots and 250 Greek Cypriots residing within the UN buffer zone

Data collection: Face-to-face interviews with a structured questionnaire at the home of respondents and in their native language

Sampling process: Multi-stage random stratified sampling

Period of data collection: 26 January – 19 February 2007

Project coordination: Brian Kelly, UNFICYP Spokesperson and Anne Bursey, UNFICYP Public Information Officer

Project consultants: Erol Kaynak and Alexandra Lordos

Field work responsibility: Prologue Consulting for Turkish Cypriots and CYMAR Market Research for Greek Cypriots

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